Expressing logical disagreement from within

Synthese 200 (2):1-33 (2022)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Against the backdrop of the frequent comparison of theories of truth in the literature on semantic paradoxes with regard to which inferences and metainferences are deemed valid, this paper develops a novel approach to defining a binary predicate for representing the valid inferences and metainferences of a theory within the theory itself under the assumption that the theory is defined with a classical meta-theory. The aim with the approach is to obtain a tool which facilitates the comparison between a theory and its competitors within the theory itself, thereby expressing the disagreement between the theories within the theories. After discussing what we can and should require of an object-linguistic representation of a theory for that purpose, this paper proposes to restrict the representation of valid metainferences to locally valid metainferences, a requirement which turns out to be \-consistent and conservative over classical first-order arithmetic. This approach is then applied to four theories definable on strong Kleene models using a labelled nested sequent calculus.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 93,069

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Analytics

Added to PP
2022-04-11

Downloads
26 (#630,780)

6 months
7 (#491,733)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Andreas Fjellstad
University of Padua

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

Saving truth from paradox.Hartry H. Field - 2008 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Outline of a theory of truth.Saul Kripke - 1975 - Journal of Philosophy 72 (19):690-716.
Spandrels of truth.J. C. Beall - 2009 - New York: Oxford University Press.
The logic of paradox.Graham Priest - 1979 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 8 (1):219 - 241.
Paradoxes and Failures of Cut.David Ripley - 2013 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (1):139 - 164.

View all 70 references / Add more references