Thick concepts and their role in moral psychology

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In Robyn Langdon & Catriona Mackenzie (eds.), Emotions, Imagination, and Moral Reasoning. Psychology Press (2012)
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Author Profiles

Peter Goldie
Manchester
Chloë FitzGerald
University of Geneva

Citations of this work

Thick Ethical Concepts.Pekka Väyrynen - 2016 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Cultivating Doxastic Responsibility.Guy Axtell - 2021 - Humana Mente 14 (39):87-125.
From personality disorders to the fact-value distinction.Konrad Banicki - 2018 - Philosophical Psychology 32 (2):274-298.

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