Abstract

The thesis demonstrates the underlying coherence of Machiavelli's political thought by deriving his manifold maxims from an unified set of psychological assumptions. In so doing, it bridges the two principal cleavages of the interpretive literature: whether Machiavelli explored only autocratic power politics or classical republicanism as well, and whether he had a normative purpose or gave merely technical advice; also, it determines the meaning of such widely debated Machiavellian concepts as virtu, ambition, the great, the people, liberty, etc. ;At root, Machiavelli assumed human beings to be individuals that have a first and second nature. In first nature, imagination and ingenuity stimulate the passions to grow into an insatiable ambition for glory, domination, wealth, and sexual pleasure. In second nature, coercive constraint may habituate individuals to cooperate in the pursuit of these ends. Regarding the first cleavage, individuals can thus be said to exist originally in a violent condition of licence, wherein political order springs from the power of an autocrat. The institutional order of a republic arises when such an autocrat habituates individuals to the "civil life"--non-exclusive government through laws. However, this civil life merely enables citizens to spare one another in order to satisfy their ambitions more effectively by jointly making war on foreigners; accordingly, J.G.A. Pocock's prominent claim that Machiavellian republics actualize Aristotelian virtue is mistaken. ;Regarding the second cleavage, Machiavelli's thought can be shown to proceed on two levels: instrumentally, it gives technical advice to rulers on how to satisfy their own ambition best; normatively, it constructs political order so that their self-seeking deeds redound to the security, greatness, empire, and treasure of the whole. ;Finally, Machiavelli's dual psychology engenders two kinds of foreign affairs. Fundamentally, states are locked into a violent struggle for domination which arises not only from ambition but from fear for preservation as well; since defensive alliances tend to fail in Machiavelli's view, this struggle leads recurrently to the formation of encompassing empire. Secondarily, habituation to peace under such an empire may temporarily enable its successor states to maintain a foreign institution that attenuates conflict among them