Signification, Essence, and Meno's Paradox: A Reply to David Charles's 'Types of Definition in the Meno'

Phronesis 55 (2):125-152 (2010)
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Abstract

According to David Charles, in the Meno Socrates fleetingly distinguishes the signification from the essence question, but, in the end, he conflates them. Doing so, Charles thinks, both leads to Meno's paradox and prevents Socrates from answering it satisfactorily. I argue that Socrates doesn't conflate the two questions, and that his reply to Meno's paradox is more satisfactory than Charles allows

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10.1163/156852810x489030

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Gail Fine
Cornell University

Citations of this work

Socrates, the primary question, and the unity of virtue.Justin C. Clark - 2015 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 45 (4):445-470.
The Search for Definitions in Early Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika.Nilanjan Das - 2023 - Journal of Indian Philosophy 51 (1):133-196.
Knowledge, discovery and reminiscence in Plato's meno.Alejandro Farieta - 2013 - Universitas Philosophica 30 (60):205-234.

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References found in this work

Plato's Moral Theory.Terence Irwin - 1979 - Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 33 (2):311-313.
Inquiry in the Meno.Gail Fine - 1992 - In Richard Kraut (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Plato. New York, NY, USA: Cambridge University Press.
Knowledge and True Belief in the Meno.Gail Fine - 2004 - Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 27:41-81.
"Anamnesis" in the "Meno".Gregory Vlastos - 1965 - Dialogue 4 (2):143-167.
The Structure of Dialectic in the Meno.Lee Franklin - 2001 - Phronesis 46 (4):413 - 439.

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