Synthese 199 (1-2):2793-2816 (2021)
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| Abstract |
What is the content of a mental state? This question poses the problem of intentionality: to explain how mental states can be about other things, where being about them is understood as representing them. A framework that integrates predictive coding and signaling systems theories of cognitive processing offers a new perspective on intentionality. On this view, at least some mental states are evaluations, which differ in function, operation, and normativity from representations. A complete naturalistic theory of intentionality must account for both types of intentional state.
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| Keywords | naturalizing content intentionality predictive coding signaling shannon communication mental representation |
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| DOI | 10.1007/s11229-020-02912-9 |
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References found in this work BETA
Psychosemantics: The Problem of Meaning in the Philosophy of Mind.Jerry A. Fodor - 1987 - MIT Press.
Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism.Ruth Garrett Millikan - 1984 - MIT Press.
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Citations of this work BETA
Schema-Centred Unity and Process-Centred Pluralism of the Predictive Mind.Nina Poth - forthcoming - Minds and Machines:1-27.
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