Synthese 199 (1-2):2793-2816 (2021)

Authors
Carrie Figdor
University of Iowa
Abstract
What is the content of a mental state? This question poses the problem of intentionality: to explain how mental states can be about other things, where being about them is understood as representing them. A framework that integrates predictive coding and signaling systems theories of cognitive processing offers a new perspective on intentionality. On this view, at least some mental states are evaluations, which differ in function, operation, and normativity from representations. A complete naturalistic theory of intentionality must account for both types of intentional state.
Keywords naturalizing content  intentionality  predictive coding  signaling  shannon communication  mental representation
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DOI 10.1007/s11229-020-02912-9
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