“Just not so stories”: Exaptations, spandrels, and constraints

Behavioral and Brain Sciences 25 (4):517-518 (2002)
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Abstract

It is anthropomorphic to speak of Nature designing adaptations for a specific function, as if with conscious intent. Any effect constitutes an adaptive function if it contributes to survival and to reproduction. Natural selection is blind to what might have been the original function. Mutations arise by purest accident and are selected based on whatever fortuitous effects they might produce.

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