The experiment and its role in the theory of knowledge

Philosophy of Science 18 (3):253-258 (1951)
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Abstract

The theory of knowledge is justified only by its results. Each of its statements is essentially an hypothesis, valuable in so far as its practical purpose is fulfilled. Consequently, the same speculative characteristics common to all natural sciences, must be attributed also to the theory of knowledge.

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10.1086/287158

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