Abstract

The problem of measurement in quantum physics is one of the most recalcitrant problems of science. Part of the problem lies in the fact that several conflicting interpretations that account for how measurement takes place have endured. Most theorists of science assume that one of the available interpretations, or a future variation of one, will prove to be the true interpretation. What I argue in this dissertation is that the proper response to this problem may be to have a framework in which different relevant interpretations can coexist and offer critical examinations of the conceptual issues related to the problem of measurement. This pluralism of interpretations is not the result of some flaw or inadequacy in quantum physics. From this alternative framework, pluralism in the problem of measurement can be understood as an acceptable, even necessary, response to the process of theorizing and experimentation in quantum mechanics. ;An important claim in this dissertation is that contemporary versions of pluralism in philosophy of science do not provide an account that recognizes the viability of all the interpretations of the problem of measurement. After showing how these versions of pluralism in philosophy of science fall short, as they apply to the problem of measurement, I argue for several conditions that a pluralism needs to satisfy in order to serve as a pluralistic framework for the evaluation of all interpretations of the problem of measurement. I develop an alternative version of pluralism that does account for the existing and future plurality of interpretations of the problem of measurement. ;My proposal is that a version of pluralism based on the work of William James and Paul Feyerabend will meet these conditions. Specifically, after introducing the complex pluralism of James as a version of pluralism that comes close to accounting for the multiplicity of interpretations of the problem of measurement, I argue that his version of pluralism does not fulfill a few of the necessary conditions. Next, I use the work on pluralism of Feyerabend to fill in the lacunas left in James's account. Finally, I show how the emerging pluralist framework, what I term dynamic pluralism, satisfies the conditions for a pluralism that can serve as a framework for understanding all of the possible interpretations of the problem of measurement