An economic model of scientific rules

Economics and Philosophy 22 (2):191-212 (2006)
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Abstract

Empirical reports on scientific competition show that scientists can be depicted as self-interested, strategically behaving agents. Nevertheless, we argue that recognition-seeking scientists will have an interest in establishing methodological norms which tend to select theories of a high epistemic value, and that these norms will be still more stringent if the epistemic value of theories appears in the utility function of scientists, either directly or instrumentally. (Published Online July 11 2006) Footnotes1 The author gratefully acknowledges financial support from DGI grant BEC2002-03715 (Ministerio de Educación y Cultura). 2 The author gratefully acknowledges financial support from grants PB98-0495-C08-01 and BFF2002-03656 (Ministerio de Educación y Cultura).

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Citations of this work

A Contractarian Solution to the Experimenter’s Regress.David Teira - 2013 - Philosophy of Science 80 (5):709-720.
Science: the rules of the game.Jesús Zamora-Bonilla - 2010 - Logic Journal of the IGPL 18 (2):294-307.

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References found in this work

The Structure of Scientific Revolutions.Thomas Samuel Kuhn - 1962 - Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Edited by Otto Neurath.
The Structure of Scientific Revolutions.Thomas S. Kuhn - 1962 - Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. Edited by Ian Hacking.
How the laws of physics lie.Nancy Cartwright - 1983 - New York: Oxford University Press.

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