Abstract

In my dissertation I critically examine scientism, the theory that all knowledge is restricted to the sciences, particularly Quine's articulation of the position. Tracing the historical development of scientism from the Vienna Circle positivists to Quine, I explain Quine's internal criticisms of positivism: He retains their fundamental aim of showing that science is the only legitimate source of knowledge while abandoning the "dogmas" of narrow positivism. ;Quine's scientism is grounded by the difference between his thesis of underdetermination of theory by data and his theory of indeterminacy of translation. Quine claims there is no fact to the matter for translation, but there is a fact of the matter for physical theory. He then advocates scientism by calling on science to purge the ontology of ordinary language so that we only speak from within the ontology of physical objects. I challenge Quine's program on two counts: He argues that intensional notions are not part of a proper scientific language, and then illicitly relies on intensional notions for radical translation; and he ignores the internal integrity of our practices which make for legitimate knowledge claims outside of the sciences. ;Then, in the Wittgensteinian tradition, I argue for the legitimacy of ethics as a domain of knowledge in its own right. Pace the tradition of scientism, ethical claims have meaning, and we can determine whether moral actions are right or wrong. Moral actions, in the first instance, are comprised by relations between persons---entities not considered by physical sciences like biology. A person is distinct from the physical body of Homo sapiens considered by science. We are born into a world of persons as an ongoing affair just as Quine claims that we are born into the physical world of science. Moral knowledge consists of knowing how persons are to be treated in different contexts according to the moral rules we inherit as part of our worldview