Indispensability argument and anti-realism in philosophy of mathematics

Frontiers of Philosophy in China 2 (4):614-628 (2007)
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Abstract

The indispensability argument for abstract mathematical entities has been an important issue in the philosophy of mathematics. The argument relies on several assumptions. Some objections have been made against these assumptions, but there are several serious defects in these objections. Ameliorating these defects leads to a new anti-realistic philosophy of mathematics, mainly: first, in mathematical applications, what really exist and can be used as tools are not abstract mathematical entities, but our inner representations that we create in imagining abstract mathematical entities; second, the thoughts that we create in imagining infinite mathematical entities are bounded by external conditions.

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Yuan Feng
University of Nijmegen

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References found in this work

Science Without Numbers: A Defence of Nominalism.Hartry H. Field - 1980 - Princeton, NJ, USA: Princeton University Press.
Mathematical truth.Paul Benacerraf - 1973 - Journal of Philosophy 70 (19):661-679.
Naturalism in mathematics.Penelope Maddy - 1997 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Philosophy of Logic.Hilary Putnam - 1971 - New York, NY, USA: Routledge. Edited by Stephen Laurence & Cynthia Macdonald.

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