Abstract

In the dissertation, I attempt to defend a new theory of noncognitivism. I do this by discussing four issues, three of which pertain to the views of a group of scholars who have come to be known as "The Cornell Moral Realists". One of the most impressive aspects of the Cornell metaethics is its theoretical expansiveness. It encompasses views in philosophy of language, philosophy of science, philosophical psychology, as well as normative ethics. As such, it serves as a useful foil against which to contrast my own metaethical position. In the first chapter, I begin by discussing the viability of G. E. Moore's Open Question Argument. I contend that an updated version of Moore's OQA allows me to establish a preliminary argument in favor of noncognitivism. I begin the second chapter by explicating more fully the nature of the particular version of noncognitivism I espouse. From there, I go on to discuss the question of whether or not the amoralist is conceivable. Rather than arguing that the amoralist is not conceivable, I explain how the conceivability of the amoralist does not present a problem for the version of noncognitivism I am espousing. In the third chapter, I explain how to construct a noncognitivist semantics that can be used to undergird valid patterns of inference which contain noncognitive constituents. The third chapter is unique in its departure from direct discussion of The Cornell Moral Realists. In the final chapter, the focus of my campaign is Nicholas Sturgeon's influential discussion of the possibility of moral explanations. I contend that the existence of moral properties cannot be vindicated by attempting to parallel moral inquiry with scientific inquiry. The discussion of these four issues provides a synoptic defense of a new theory of noncognitivism