Philosophical Psychology 25 (5):673-687 (2012)

Authors
Adam Feltz
Michigan Technological University
Abstract
In two experiments, we demonstrate that intentional action intuitions vary as a function of whether one brings about or observes an event. In experiment 1a (N?=?38), participants were less likely to judge that they intended (M?=?2.53, 7 point scale) or intentionally (M?=?2.67) brought about a harmful event compared to intention (M?=?4.16) and intentionality (M?=?4.11) judgments made about somebody else. Experiments 1b and 1c confirmed and extended this pattern of actor-observer differences. Experiment 2 suggested that these actor-observer differences are not likely to occur when participants are asked to ?imagine? being an actor. We argue that these results challenge the substantial philosophical and empirical reliance on hypothetical thought examples about intentional action. Our data offer new and necessary methodological avenues for understanding folk intentional action intuitions
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1080/09515089.2011.627540
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 68,975
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Is Incompatibilism Intuitive?Jason Turner, Eddy Nahmias, Stephen Morris & Thomas Nadelhoffer - 2006 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73 (1):28-53.

View all 34 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

An Error Theory for Compatibilist Intuitions.Adam Feltz & Melissa Millan - 2015 - Philosophical Psychology 28 (4):529-555.
Perspective and Epistemic State Ascriptions.Markus Kneer - 2018 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 9 (2):313-341.

View all 8 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Folk Intuitions, Asymmetry, and Intentional Side Effects.Jason Turner - 2004 - Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology 24 (2):214-219.
On Trying to Save the Simple View.Thomas Nadelhoffer - 2006 - Mind and Language 21 (5):565-586.
Intentional Action.Alfred R. Mele & Paul K. Moser - 1994 - Noûs 28 (1):39-68.
Intentional Action and "in Order To".Eric Wiland - 2007 - Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology 27 (1):113-118.
Intentional Action First.Yair Levy - 2013 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (4):705-718.
Intentional Action: Controversies, Data, and Core Hypotheses.Alfred R. Mele - 2003 - Philosophical Psychology 16 (2):325-340.
Blame, Badness, and Intentional Action: A Reply to Knobe and Mendlow.Thomas Nadelhoffer - 2004 - Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology 24 (2):259-269.
Causalism and Intentional Omission.Joshua Shepherd - 2014 - American Philosophical Quarterly 51 (1):15-26.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2011-12-22

Total views
70 ( #162,306 of 2,498,180 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
1 ( #427,476 of 2,498,180 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes