Dynamical systems theory in cognitive science and neuroscience

Philosophy Compass 15 (8):e12695 (2020)
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Abstract

Dynamical systems theory (DST) is a branch of mathematics that assesses abstract or physical systems that change over time. It has a quantitative part (mathematical equations) and a related qualitative part (plotting equations in a state space). Nonlinear dynamical systems theory applies the same tools in research involving phenomena such as chaos and hysteresis. These approaches have provided different ways of investigating and understanding cognitive systems in cognitive science and neuroscience. The ‘dynamical hypothesis’ claims that cognition is and can be understood as dynamical systems. Common consequences for such an approach include rejecting understanding cognition as information processing in nature, including eschewing explanatory roles for computation or representation. Contemporary applications of DST include mouse‐tracking studies in cognitive science and nonrepresentational perspectives on motor control in neuroscience. Such work has philosophical implications concerning the boundaries of cognition, explanation, and representations. DST offers powerful methodology and theories that raise many topics of philosophical significance.

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Luis H. Favela
University of Central Florida

References found in this work

A Dynamic Systems Approach to the Development of Cognition and Action.David Morris, E. Thelen & L. B. Smith - 1997 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 11 (2).
Finding Structure in Time.Jeffrey L. Elman - 1990 - Cognitive Science 14 (2):179-211.
Embodied Cognition.Lawrence A. Shapiro - 2010 - New York: Routledge.
The Bounds of Cognition.Sven Walter - 2001 - Philosophical Psychology 14 (2):43-64.

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