Still No Suicide for Presentists: Why Hales’ Response Fails

Logos and Episteme (1):149-155 (2012)
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Abstract

In this paper, I defend my original objection to Hales’ suicide machine argument against Hales’ response. I argue Hales’ criticisms are either misplaced or underestimate the strength of my objection; if the constraints of the original objection are respected, my original objection blocks Hales’ reply. To be thorough, I restate an improved version of the objection to the suicide machine argument. I conclude that Hales fails to motivate a reasonable worry as to the supposed suicidal nature of presentist time travel.

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2012-03-31

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Jimmy Alfonso Licon
Arizona State University

Citations of this work

Jury Theorems for Peer Review.Marcus Arvan, Liam Kofi Bright & Remco Heesen - forthcoming - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science.
Presentists Should Not Believe in Time Travel.Takeshi Sakon - 2021 - Kagaku Tetsugaku 53 (2):191-213.

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