Are the Moral Fixed Points Conceptual Truths?

Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy (1):1-9 (2016)
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Terence Cuneo and Russ Shafer-Landau have recently proposed a new version of moral nonnaturalism, according to which there are nonnatural moral concepts and truths but no nonnatural moral facts. This view entails that moral error theorists are conceptually deficient. We explain why moral error theorists are not conceptually deficient. We then argue that this explanation reveals what is wrong with Cuneo and Shafer-Landau’s view.

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Author Profiles

Bart Streumer
University of Groningen
Daan Evers
University of Groningen

Citations of this work

Debunking, Epistemic Achievement, and Undermining Defeat.Michael Klenk - 2022 - American Philosophical Quarterly 59 (1):43-60.
Why Care About Moral Fixed Points?David Killoren - 2016 - Analytic Philosophy 57 (2):165-173.

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