Identity and bias in philosophy: What philosophers can learn from stem subjects

Think 20 (59):117-131 (2021)
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Abstract

This article centres on two distinct but intersecting questions: does it matter if we cannot definitively answer the question ‘what is philosophy?’ and do philosophers exhibit bias? The article will answer ‘yes’ to both questions for the following reasons. First because the uncertainty has allowed some answers to dominate. Second, because the answers necessarily demonstrate biases, and these have led to a lack of diversity in the discipline. Following this, the article will consider why philosophers have been slow or reluctant to accept that bias plays a role in what we do. This lack of recognition has, I suggest, limited opportunity for diverse approaches, methods, and standpoints to flourish. The discipline has suffered as a result, and so too have diverse philosophers. Many fields in science, technology, engineering and mathematics meanwhile have sought to tackle the lack of diversity head on, and philosophers would do well to heed their examples.

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