Abstract

Sense-phenomenalism according to Chimakonam is a ‘body-only-model’ of personal identity which holds that an individual’s identity is determined by the physical features that are sensually perceptible by other humans in society. I argue in this work that this theory has some implications for the theory of knowledge. First, it leads to the belief that we can only gain knowledge through the ‘other’, which further suggests that the individual cannot know himself/herself except through the other. Second, I contend that Chimakonam’s leaning on Menkiti’s community-based conception of personhood, with its obvious limitations, to substantiate his theory, is problematic. Finally, I suggest that this view would also encourage epistemic marginalization and racial discrimination based on bodily features. I show that this further complicates the problem of social epistemology, self-knowledge and the question of what part of the human system knowledge resides.