Consciousness and Physicalism: A Defense of the Phenomenal Concept Strategy

New York: Routledge (2017)
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Abstract

_Physicalism and the Spell of Consciousness_ explores the nature of consciousness, arguing that ontologically speaking, consciousness and matter are one and the same since both are physical entities. By synthesizing work in the philosophy of mind and metaphysics from the last twenty years and forging a dialogue with contemporary research in empirical sciences of the mind, Andreas Elpidorou develops an account of the concepts that we deploy when we introspectively examine our conscious experiences, and defends the view that the uniqueness of consciousness is an unavoidable consequence of being conscious of consciousness. This book provides an up-to-date, systematic defense of the phenomenal concept strategy, and offers a theory-based formulation of physicalism. Elpidorou links metaphysics and empirical philosophy of mind by showing how embodied cognition allows us to explain the appearance of contingency that is present in mind-brain identity statements. His argument is situated at the intersections of philosophy of mind, metaphysics, epistemology, and philosophy of cognitive science, and advances the debate regarding the ontological status of consciousness.

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original Elpidorou, Andreas; Dove, Guy (2018) "Consciousness and Physicalism: A Defense of the Phenomenal Concept Strategy". Routledge

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Ist der Naturalismus eine Ideologie?Thomas Jussuf Spiegel - 2020 - Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 68 (1):51-71.

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