Optional Stops, Foregone Conclusions, and the Value of Argument

Croatian Journal of Philosophy 4 (3):317-329 (2004)
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Abstract

If the point of argument is to produce conviction, an argument tor a foregone conclusion is pointless. I maintain, however, that an argument makes a variety of cognitive contributions, even when its conclusion is already believed. It exhibits warrant. It affords reasons that we can impart to others. It identifies bases tor agreement among parties who otherwise disagree. It underwrites confidence, by showing how vulnerable warrant is under changes in background assumptions. Multiple arguments for the same conclusion show how our beliefs hang together.

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Catherine Elgin
Harvard University

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References found in this work

Socratic puzzles.Robert Nozick - 1997 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Socratic Puzzles.Robert Nozick - 1997 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 60 (2):418-418.
Socratic Puzzles.Robert Nozick - 1995 - Phronesis 40 (2):143 - 155.
Introduction.Robert Nozick - 1993 - In The Nature of Rationality. Princeton University Press.

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