Can a dialetheist stay regular?

Journal of Applied Non-Classical Logics:1-20 (forthcoming)
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Abstract

For a dialetheist, it is rational to believe that true contradictions exist. However, we argue that a dialetheist faces a complex dilemma given some bridge principles for rational beliefs that connect possibility and probability, including the so-called ‘Regularity Principle’. Either her belief is not doxastically possible even for her, or she must assign positive credence to the proposition that dialetheia exists. The former makes her belief prima facie self-defeating. The latter seems to compel her to choose between several more fine-grained options, each of which seems undesirable for a regular and rational probability theory. It is unclear how a dialetheist would stay rationally regular, so we pose this challenge, seeking a response from a dialetheist.

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Author Profiles

Peter Eldridge-Smith
Australian National University
Jeremiah Joven Joaquin
De La Salle University

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References found in this work

Two notions of necessity.Martin Davies & Lloyd Humberstone - 1980 - Philosophical Studies 38 (1):1-31.
Doubt Truth to Be a Liar.Graham Priest - 2007 - Studia Logica 87 (1):129-134.
Regularity and Hyperreal Credences.Kenny Easwaran - 2014 - Philosophical Review 123 (1):1-41.
Thinking the impossible.Graham Priest - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (10):2649-2662.
Dialetheism.Francesco Berto, Graham Priest & Zach Weber - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 2018 (2018).

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