Probability theory and the doomsday argument

Mind 102 (407):483-488 (1993)
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Abstract

John Leslie has published an argument that our own birth rank among all who have lived can be used to make inferences about all who will ever live, and hence about the expected survival time for the human race. It is found to be shorter than usually supposed. The assumptions underpinning the argument are criticized, especially the unwarranted one that the argument's sampling is equiprobable from among all who ever live. A mathematical derivation shows that Leslie's argument is correct only if there exists a correlation of our birth rank to the event of doomsday. Such correlation is highly improbable

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Citations of this work

Four Problems about Self-Locating Belief.Darren Bradley - 2012 - Philosophical Review 121 (2):149-177.
John Cook Wilson.Mathieu Marion - 2010 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Reference, Truth, and Biological Kinds.Marcel Weber - 2014 - In: J. Dutant, D. Fassio and A. Meylan (Eds.) Liber Amicorum Pascal Engel.
Comment l'Urne de Carter et Leslie se Déverse dans celle de Hempel.Paul Franceschi - 1999 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 29 (1):139-156.

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