Why Countable Additivity?

Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 2 (1):53-61 (2013)
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Abstract

It is sometimes alleged that arguments that probability functions should be countably additive show too much, and that they motivate uncountable additivity as well. I show this is false by giving two naturally motivated arguments for countable additivity that do not motivate uncountable additivity

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Kenny Easwaran
University of California, Irvine

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References found in this work

Countable additivity and subjective probability.Jon Williamson - 1999 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 50 (3):401-416.
An airtight dutch book.Vann McGee - 1999 - Analysis 59 (4):257–265.
An airtight Dutch book.V. McGee - 1999 - Analysis 59 (4):257-265.
Coherence, probability and induction.Brian Skyrms - 1992 - Philosophical Issues 2:215-226.

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