Authors
Kenny Easwaran
Texas A&M University
Abstract
It is sometimes alleged that arguments that probability functions should be countably additive show too much, and that they motivate uncountable additivity as well. I show this is false by giving two naturally motivated arguments for countable additivity that do not motivate uncountable additivity
Keywords finite additivity  Dutch book  probability  countable additivity  comparative probability
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DOI 10.1002/tht3.60
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References found in this work BETA

Countable Additivity and Subjective Probability.Jon Williamson - 1999 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 50 (3):401-416.
An Airtight Dutch Book.Vann McGee - 1999 - Analysis 59 (4):257–265.
An Airtight Dutch Book.V. McGee - 1999 - Analysis 59 (4):257-265.
Coherence, Probability and Induction.Brian Skyrms - 1992 - Philosophical Issues 2:215-226.

View all 6 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Chance and the Continuum Hypothesis.Daniel Hoek - 2021 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 103 (3):639-60.
Conditional Probabilities.Kenny Easwaran - 2019 - In Richard Pettigrew & Jonathan Weisberg (eds.), The Open Handbook of Formal Epistemology. PhilPapers Foundation. pp. 131-198.
Bayesian Epistemology.William Talbott - 2006 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Bayesian Humility.Adam Elga - 2016 - Philosophy of Science 83 (3):305-323.
Infinitesimal Gunk.Lu Chen - 2020 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 49 (5):981-1004.

View all 12 citations / Add more citations

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