Abstract

This thesis studies the human rights philosophy presented during the first productions of Shakespeare's plays, putting it in touch with that reflected in United Nations human rights law and the political theory of John Rawls. Its opening chapter discusses twentieth-century scholarship exemplary of the criticism relevant to human rights ideas in Shakespeare. The sixteenth-century historical context, so emphatically identified by historians with the institution of modern freedom, is kept in sight throughout, and provides, with the cultural context , the key to detailed explications, of four plays: King John, Much Ado About Nothing, Hamlet and All's Well That Ends Well. Interpreted by these means, the first two plays are seen to have enacted, at the time of their first performances, the religious strife that ironically gave birth both to the ideal of freedom of conscience and ideological complications restricting its implementation. The latter plays unfolded arguments concerning the relationship between epistemology and freedom of conscience. The questions addressed in these four plays range from the relationship between social stability, moral values, and the practicability of freedom of conscience to the criteria whereby coercion and abuse of freedom of conscience may be distinguished from legitimate exercise of freedom of expression. The characteristics of epistemologies enhancing the implementation of freedom of conscience and the educational process that promotes the moral attributes and social conditions necessary for the adoption of these are delineated. The freedom of conscience theory the plays proposed for those members of their first audiences attuned to its metaphoric language is remarkably thought-provoking as regards current challenges in human rights philosophy and law, and reinforces the argument that literature, and in particular theatre, have vital roles in social change and intellectual development.