Abstract

This dissertation examines the political meaning of conscience in the writings of John Calvin, John Locke, and J. S. Mill. I argue that, although their conceptions of conscience differ, they share an ambivalence toward conscience in that they wish to' extend its freedom but fear the effects of unrestrained consciences. Calvin attempts to strike a course between Catholicism's ecclesiastical laws that "bind" conscience, on the one hand, and the antinomianism of the Anabaptists, on the other, by putting forth a conception of conscience as an innate sense of the moral law that mediates between God and the individual. The effects of sin, however, require that conscience be subject to the "outward helps" of the church and government, even though Calvin maintains that conscience is free. ;Locke understands conscience as a judgment on one's actions, based upon the moral principles one holds. Since true principles are discoverable in the law of nature, Locke wants conscience to be governed by reason. I argue that, despite his fear of unreasonable consciences, Locke's vision of a polity founded on consent depends on conscience. Mill understands conscience as a feeling of pain that has become associated with particular actions. Although our consciences are shaped for us in this way, Mill contends that they can also be shaped by us. He wants the consciences of individuals to be shaped such that the good of others is connected to one's own good. Although this calls for a degree of social conformity that is at odds with Mill's emphasis on individuality, this tension is lessened when one recognizes that Mill desires conscience that are shaped for liberty. ;In the final chapter, I reconstruct this ambivalence in terms of a tension between the freedom and public authority of conscience. I argue that modern thought is marked by what I call the paradox of conscience: in order for conscience to be free, it must be governed. I suggest that Mill best helps us confront the paradox of conscience and, governed. I suggest that Mill best helps us confront the paradox of conscience and, thereby, come to terms with our own unease over the political meaning of conscience