Conundrums of Belief Self-Control

The Monist 85 (3):456-467 (2002)
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A much disputed conceptual argument aims to show the impossibility of direct believing at will. Regardless of the success of this argument, it has been held to be impotent against indirect forms of belief-control, such as by developing oneself to be more careful or fair-minded in evaluating evidence. However, the shift to indirect forms inherits difficulties connected to the conceptual argument.



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