Event-causal libertarianism’s control conundrums

Grazer Philosophische Studien 88 (1):227-246 (2013)
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Abstract

Event-causal libertarianism concerning free will faces two challenging problems of control. Indeterminism so diminishes control that it is incompatible with an indeterministically caused act's being free. Since event-causal libertarianism's metaphysical or agency commitments are no richer than those of its best compatibilist rivals, how does event-causal libertarianism secure for libertarian free agents more control than these rivals? I argue that the two problems are inextricably associated in that whether event-causal libertarianism can deliver enhanced control depends upon a solution to problem , but there are formidable hurdles in the way of reaching this solution

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Ishtiyaque Haji
University of Calgary

Citations of this work

The fruitful death of modal collapse arguments.Joseph C. Schmid - 2021 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 91 (1):3-22.
The Obligation Dilemma.Ishtiyaque Haji - 2017 - The Journal of Ethics 21 (1):37-61.

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