George Combe and common sense

British Journal for the History of Science 48 (2):233-259 (2015)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

This article examines the history of two fields of enquiry in late eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century Scotland: the rise and fall of the common sense school of philosophy and phrenology as presented in the works of George Combe. Although many previous historians have construed these histories as separate, indeed sometimes incommensurate, I propose that their paths were intertwined to a greater extent than has previously been given credit. The philosophy of common sense was a response to problems raised by Enlightenment thinkers, particularly David Hume, and spurred a theory of the mind and its mode of study. In order to succeed, or even to be considered a rival of these established understandings, phrenologists adapted their arguments for the sake of engaging in philosophical dispute. I argue that this debate contributed to the relative success of these groups: phrenology as a well-known historical subject, common sense now largely forgotten. Moreover, this history seeks to question the place of phrenology within the sciences of mind in nineteenth-century Britain.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 93,612

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Analytics

Added to PP
2016-06-30

Downloads
20 (#181,865)

6 months
5 (#1,552,255)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

Mind, Brain and Adaptation in the Nineteenth Century.Robert M. Young & Nils Roll-Hansen - 1994 - History and Philosophy of the Life Sciences 16 (2):355.
Brainhood, anthropological figure of modernity.Fernando Vidal - 2009 - History of the Human Sciences 22 (1):5-36.
The Edinburgh Phrenology Debate: 1803–1828.G. N. Cantor - 1975 - Annals of Science 32 (3):195-218.

View all 20 references / Add more references