Abstract

This dissertation is on what it means to call a person evil. This is evil as an adjective, describing a person, not evil in any other sense. It considers various theories on what an evil person is. Since many may already have preconceived notions of what this is, the first theories considered are simple theories people may already hold. This gets them out of the way, establishes the need to consider the question further, and leads to the first guideline for recognizing the correct theory, which is that an evil person has an evil character. The next chapter examines four theories of character, those of Richard B. Brandt, Aristotle, John Kekes, and Joel Kupperman. It hybridizes the best parts of these theories, concluding that character is made up of the habits, moral beliefs, psychological capacities, intentions, and motivations that shape one's dispositions in matters of morality or happiness. The next chapter examines some simple character theories in order to establish guidelines for identifying which kind of character is evil. It establishes that an evil character is the morally worst kind of bad character. With this guideline established, subsequent chapters examine different theories of evil. The theories considered include Kekes' theory that an evil character is one dominated by vices, my own hypothesis that an evil character is an immoral and wicked character, Laurence Mordekhai Thomas's theory that an evil person is someone who is often enough prone to commit evil acts, the Christian notion that evil is a form of pride, and a theory, based on the work of Michael Gelven, that evil is a betrayal of what makes life worthwhile and meaningful. The final chapter compares the leading theories, identifies what they share in common, selects the best among them, fixes some problems with it, then arrives at the conclusion that an evil character can be described as an inhuman and monstrous character