Intention, responsibility and double effect

Philosophical Quarterly 32 (126):1-16 (1982)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

I discuss a significant distinction between two different applications of the principle of double effect. It serves sometimes to distinguish the intended effects of an action from side-Effects which are "relevant" to it, As providing reasons against it, For which the agent must admit responsibility, And of which he is the intentional agent; and sometimes to distinguish intended effects from side-Effects which are "irrelevant" to the action, As to which the agent denies responsibility and intentional agency

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,829

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Who is entitled to double effect?Joseph Boyle - 1991 - Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 16 (5):475-494.
Intentions, motives and the doctrine of double effect.Lawrence Masek - 2010 - Philosophical Quarterly 60 (240):567-585.
Four versions of double effect.Donald B. Marquis - 1991 - Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 16 (5):515-544.
The Double Failure of 'Double Effect'.Neil Roughley - 2007 - In Christoph Lumer & Sandro Nannini (eds.), Intentionality, Deliberation, and Autonomy. Ashgate.
Double effect, double intention, and asymmetric warfare.Steven Lee - 2004 - Journal of Military Ethics 3 (3):233-251.
Intention and responsibility in double effect cases.David K. Chan - 2000 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 3 (4):405-434.

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
146 (#128,177)

6 months
13 (#192,902)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

R. A. Duff
University of Stirling

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references