Philosophical Quarterly 22 (86):61-64 (1972)

It is urged (1) that geach is correct in his claim ("assertion", "philosophical review", 74, (1965), Page 449) that what he calls 'the frege point' is logically independent of frege's doctrine that sentences are names of objects, And (2) that frege's 'propositions of begriffsschrift' are neither truths nor falsehoods
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DOI 10.2307/2218594
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Judgement and the Epistemic Foundation of Logic.Maria van der Schaar (ed.) - 2012 - Dordrecht, Netherland: Springer.

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