In Paul Weingartner Gabriele M. Mras (ed.), Philosophy of Logic and Mathematics: Proceedings of the 41st International Ludwig Wittgenstein Symposium. Berlin, Germany: De Gruyter. pp. 169–182 (2019)

Authors
Christoph C. Pfisterer
University of Zürich
Abstract
In the Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein famously criticizes Frege’s conception of assertion. “Frege’s opinion that every assertion contains an assumption”, says Wittgenstein, rests on the possibility of parsing every assertoric sentence into two components: one expressing the assumption that is put forward for assertion, the other expressing that it is asserted. But this possibility does not entail that the “assertion consists of two acts, entertaining and asserting” - any more than the possibility of rendering assertions as pairs of questions and affirmative answers entails that they consist of questions. Frege scholars protest that such criticism is inappropriate, not only because Frege doesn’t speak about assumptions, but also - and crucially - because Wittgenstein fails to address the logical nature of assertion as reflected in Frege’s use of the judgment stroke. They seem to read Wittgenstein’s argument in the light of a remark in the Tractatus saying that the judgment stroke is “logically meaningless” because it simply indicates that the author holds the propositions marked with this sign to be true. In this paper, I argue that Wittgenstein’s criticism of Frege is not that the latter’s conception of judgment and assertion contains a corrupting psychological element. Rather, the criticism is that for Frege judgment and assertion are composed of two separate acts, i.e. an act of referring to a truth value and an act of determining which of the two it is. Through a detailed examination of the “black-spot analogy” in the Tractatus, I want to show that Wittgenstein presents a serious objection to Frege’s conception of judgment and assertion.
Keywords Gottlob Frege  Ludwig Wittgenstein  judgment  truth
Categories (categorize this paper)
Buy the book Find it on Amazon.com
DOI 10.1515/9783110657883-011
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 69,078
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

The Early Wittgenstein on Logical Assertion.Ian Proops - 1997 - Philosophical Topics 25 (2):121-144.
Frege and Wittgenstein's Tractatus.Irving M. Copi - 1976 - Philosophia 6 (3-4):447-461.
Frege's Conception of Truth: Two Readings.Junyeol Kim - 2019 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 6.
Frege's Influence on Wittgenstein: Reversing Metaphysics Via the Context Principle.Erich Reck - 2005 - In Gottlob Frege: Critical Assessments of Leading Philosophers, Vol. I. London: Routledge. pp. 241-289.
Wittgenstein on “I Believe”.Wolfgang Freitag - 2018 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 95 (1):54-69.
The Logical Significance of Assertion: Frege on the Essence of Logic.Walter B. Pedriali - 2017 - Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy 5 (8).
Frege on Assertion.V. H. Dudman - 1972 - Philosophical Quarterly 22 (86):61-64.
Frege and the Later Wittgenstein.P. M. S. Hacker - 1999 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 44:223-247.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2019-12-04

Total views
10 ( #896,280 of 2,498,932 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
2 ( #279,629 of 2,498,932 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes