Abstract

The views of Hegel and Marx are put into perspective by observing how each developed his argument for historical inevitability in response to the philosophical constraints and opportunities created by his predecessor. ;Hegel's development is related to the Kantianism in which he was schooled. His problem was to overcome Kantian arguments forbidding claims to know that human exercise of freedom and reason inevitably progresses in history. Not wishing to abandon the paramountcy of freedom in history, he chose reconstrue "necessity" in such a way that it is not incompatible with freedom. Application of some distinctions developed in the Logic--"blind" vs. "unveiled" necessity, the "contingency" vs. "hardness" of fate--shows that his statements on the "cunning of reason" encapsulate his solution to this problem. ;Different patterns of argument for the inevitability of macroscopic historical changes are discerned in Marx's early and later writings. The early pattern was rejected because it required premises inconsistent with elements of his critique of Hegel. A distinct pattern of argument is found in The German Ideology and subsequent writings. This type of argument emulates Hegel's treatment of "real possibility" in that it ascribes necessity to an outcome just because, among possible outcomes for which some conditions are present, all but this one lack a complete set of sufficient conditions. Thus actual courses of development are explained, in part, by the insufficiency of available conditions for alternative paths. ;The concluding chapter argues that, on these and related topics, it is generally mistaken to interpret Marx's or Engels's expressed emulation for Hegel as a sign of agreement with his doctrines