Two Conceptions of Knowledge

Grazer Philosophische Studien 40 (1):15-30 (1991)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

There are two ways to think about knowledge: From the bottom-up point of view, knowledge is an early arrival on the evolutionary scene; it is what animals need in order to coordinate their behavior with the environmental conditions. The top-down approach, departing from Descartes, considers knowledge constituted by a justified belief which gains its justification only in so far as the process by means of which it is reached conforms to canons of sciemific inference and rational theory choice. Keith Lehrer's epistemology is analyzed as a top-down intemahst position and criticised with examples that show that in certain cases obviously knowledge is attained without meeting the standards for reliability of sources and processing of the required informantion.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,846

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Keith Lehrer on the basing relation.Hannah Tierney & Nicholas D. Smith - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 161 (1):27-36.
Justification as the appearance of knowledge.Steven L. Reynolds - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 163 (2):367-383.
No Luck With Knowledge? On a Dogma of Epistemology.Peter Baumann - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 89 (3):523-551.
Epistemology.Matthias Steup - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Knowledge and evidence.Paul K. Moser - 1989 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
Dretske on knowledge and content.Olav Gjelsvik - 1991 - Synthese 86 (March):425-41.
What Should a Theory of Knowledge Do?Elijah Chudnoff - 2011 - Dialectica 65 (4):561-579.
Theory of knowledge.Keith Lehrer - 1990 - Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press.
Knowledge and belief.Frederick F. Schmitt - 1992 - New York: Routledge.
Dretske on knowledge closure.Steven Luper - 2006 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 84 (3):379 – 394.

Analytics

Added to PP
2013-04-04

Downloads
73 (#225,525)

6 months
14 (#179,338)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Fred Dretske
Last affiliation: Duke University

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references