Mindreading, Mindsharing, and the Origins of Self-Consciousness

Philosophical Topics 40 (2):39-70 (2012)
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Abstract

Philosophers and psychologists have traditionally understood folk psychology to emerge in one of two ways: either first through the origin of the function of self-consciousness or first through the origin of the function of mindreading. The aim of this paper is to provide reasons to doubt that those options exhaust the possibilities. In particular, I will argue that in the discussion about whether self-consciousness or mindreading evolved first, we have lost sight of a viable third option. I will urge that mindsharing—the kind of intersubjectivity involved in joint engagement—may have been an important precursor to the ascription of mentalstates to selves and others. I analyze arguments for the view that mindreading evolved prior to self-consciousness, which I call “the mindreading priority account.” I acknowledge that proponents of the mindreading priority account are correct to stress the importance of our social natures in the emergence of self-consciousness. However, such accounts have focused too narrowly on mindreading as the biological function that is the basis of the development of self-consciousness. I argue that there are methodological reasons to doubt that mindreading is prior to self-consciousness, because awareness of oneself and awareness of others is symmetrical. I argue that there are empirical reasons to doubt that there is evidence for an adaptation explanation for mindreading. I provide a skeptical argument against the mindreading priority account by critiquingtwo central assumptions of that account, namely that mindreading is an adaptation and self-consciousness is a byproduct of mindreading. I consider an alternative view of mindsharing as the function of folk psychology and suggest that the mindsharing account may be on better grounds than the mindreading account in terms of providing an explanation of the origins of self-consciousness. In addition, I will outline an account of the development of self-consciousness and mindreading that emerges from mindsharing. In the conclusion, I will consider two objections to my account and reply to both objections.

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James M. Dow
Hendrix College

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