Abstract

The general level of democratic, political culture in one country is the important determinant that should be taken into consideration both when analyzing its constitutional order as well as when considering its future shaping and direction. Countries that have had a substantial discontinuity in their historical-democratic development face special challenges when returning to the paths of liberal-democratic constitutionality, perhaps the biggest of which is raising the general level of political culture and(re)building a constitutional, democratic tradition. During this process particular systematic distortions may occur, among others, those regarding the mutual control and influence of the highest state authorities. In the Republic of Serbia, there is a noticeable inconsistency in what is generally perceived by the general public (as well as by the constitutional law scholars) as the level of powers and the authority of the President of the Republic. Constitutional framework is often being interpreted without taking the wider scope of the problem into consideration, which includes the immaturity of the democratic culture. This leads to (apparent) inconsistency between the presidential powers by the Constitution and how they really manifest themselves in reality. In this paper the author analyses Serbian constitutional omissions in this regard and offers possible solutions.