Abstract

Some philosophers claim that the Judaeo-Christian God not only does not exist but could not exist. In support, they offer over various arguments to show that one or more of the properties commonly associated with this God are inconsistent. One such argument, for instance, says it is impossible to be perfectly just and merciful, since one is merciful precisely by being unjust in favor of those to whom one shows mercy. ;I suggest that the logical problems in question result from assuming a popular view of God's nature---that God is the being, if any, who is supremely perfect . I develop an alternative view on which God is the being, if any, who satisfies a relational role specified by the texts of the tradition---the being who, in particular, accounts for the existence of the world, miracles and religious experiences; is worthy of awe, trust and love; and warrants worship and prayer. I argue that a being does not need the perfections to do these jobs and so escapes inconsistency