Semantics and the Ambiguity of Proper Names

The Monist 59 (3):404-423 (1976)
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Abstract

In the last year or two, the “causal theory” of proper names, first suggested by Saul Kripke in 1967, has received a lot of attention. This paper has two aims. First, to show that the causal theory offers the most plausible solution to a problem posed by the well-known fact that proper names typically have more than one bearer. Second, to consider the implications of this discussion, and of the causal theory, for semantics as a whole.

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Michael Devitt
CUNY Graduate Center

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Against Direct Reference.Michael Devitt - 1989 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 14 (1):206-240.
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