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On Determining What There Isn't
In Dominic Murphy & Michael Bishop (eds.), Stich. Wiley‐Blackwell. pp. 46–61 (2009-03-20)
Abstract
This chapter contains sections titled: Introduction The Theory of Reference as Folk Semantics The Theory of Reference as Proto‐Science Metaphysics Before Semantics How Then Do We Do the Metaphysics? Conclusion References.Author's Profile
on determining what there isn't Stich attracted to arguments for eliminativism about the mind – arguments against “intentional realism” theory of reference as folk semantics – Stich, usual epistemic one but rather a special metaphysical/methodological one Theory of Reference as Proto‐Science ‐ Stich describing proto‐science account metaphysics before semantics ‐ Stich's gloom about theory of reference leads and “semantic ascent” empirical metaphysics and empirical semantics “How are we to go about deciding whether or not the entities posited by any false theory exist?” Stich is absolutely right ‐ it was a mistake to tackle ontological issues, including that of intentional realism, by appeal to theory of reference
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Citations of this work
Experimental Semantics.Michael Devitt - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 82 (2):418 - 435.
If Folk Intuitions Vary, Then What?Edouard Machery, Ron Mallon, Shaun Nichols & Stephen P. Stich - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 86 (3):618-635.
The Reference of Proper Names: Testing Usage and Intuitions.Michael Devitt & Nicolas Porot - 2018 - Cognitive Science 42 (5):1552-1585.
Meta-Externalism vs Meta-Internalism in the Study of Reference.Daniel Cohnitz & Jussi Haukioja - 2013 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (3):475-500.
Must Naturalism Lead to a Deflationary Meta-Ontology?Matthew Haug - 2014 - Metaphysica 15 (2):347-367.
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