Explaining as Mediated Action

Science & Education 25 (3-4):343-362 (2016)
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Abstract

Explaining is one of the most important everyday practices in science education. In this article, we examine how scientific explanations could serve as cultural tools for members of a group of pre-service physics teachers. Specifically, we aim at their use of explanations about forces of inertia in non-inertial frames of reference. A basic assumption of our study is that explanatory tools (e.g., typical explanations learned) shape the ways we think and speak about the world. Drawing on the theory of mediated action, analysis illustrates three major claims on scientific explanations: (1) explaining is an act of actively responding to explanations presented by others (and not only to evidence itself); (2) the actual experience of explaining involves the enactment of power and authority; (3) resistance (not acknowledging an explanation as one’s own) might be a constitutive part of learning how to explain (hence, teachers could approach scientific explanation in a less dogmatic way). These assertions expand the possibilities of dialogue between studies of scientific explanations and the social sciences. Implications for science teaching and research in science education are presented.

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References found in this work

The Scientific Image.William Demopoulos & Bas C. van Fraassen - 1982 - Philosophical Review 91 (4):603.
Pragmatism: A New Name for Some Old Ways of Thinking.William James - 2014 - Gorham, ME: Cambridge University Press. Edited by Eric C. Sheffield.
Studies in the logic of explanation.Carl Gustav Hempel & Paul Oppenheim - 1948 - Philosophy of Science 15 (2):135-175.

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