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The path not taken
Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):252-253 (1995)
Abstract
The differences Block attempts to capture with his putative distinction between P-consciousness and A-consciousness are more directly and perspicuously handled in terms of differences in richness of content and degree of influence. Block's critiques, based on his misbegotten distinction, evaporate on closer inspection.Author's Profile
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Citations of this work
Are There Unconscious Perceptual Processes?Berit Brogaard - 2011 - Consciousness and Cognition 20 (2):449-63.
Dislocation, Not Dissociation: The Neuroanatomical Argument Against Visual Experience Driving Motor Action.Benjamin Kozuch - 2015 - Mind and Language 30 (5):572-602.
Do we know how happy we are? On some limits of affective introspection and recall.Daniel M. Haybron - 2007 - Noûs 41 (3):394–428.
Neurophenomenology: An introduction for neurophilosophers.Evan Thompson, A. Lutz & D. Cosmelli - 2005 - In Andrew Brook & Kathleen Akins (eds.), Cognition and the Brain: The Philosophy and Neuroscience Movement. Cambridge University Press. pp. 40.
Phenomenal consciousness, attention and accessibility.Tobias Schlicht - 2012 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 11 (3):309-334.
References found in this work
The Varieties of Reference.Gareth Evans - 1982 - Oxford: Oxford University Press. Edited by John Henry McDowell.
Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind.John R. Searle - 1983 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
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