Dislocation, Not Dissociation: The Neuroanatomical Argument Against Visual Experience Driving Motor Action
Mind and Language 30 (5):572-602 (2015)
AbstractCommon sense suggests that visual consciousness is essential to skilled motor action, but Andy Clark—inspired by Milner and Goodale's dual visual systems theory—has appealed to a wide range of experimental dissociations to argue that such an assumption is false. Critics of Clark's argument contend that the content driving motor action is actually within subjects' experience, just not easily discovered. In this article, I argue that even if such content exists, it cannot be guiding motor action, since a review of current visual neuroscience indicates that the visual brain areas producing conscious representations are distinct from those driving motor action
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Citations of this work
Intentions: The Dynamic Hierarchical Model Revisited.Elisabeth Pacherie & Myrto Mylopoulos - 2019 - WIREs Cognitive Science 10 (2):e1481.
Semantic and Pragmatic Integration in Vision for Action.Silvano Zipoli Caiani & Gabriele Ferretti - 2017 - Consciousness and Cognition 48:40-54.
Two Visual Systems in Molyneux Subjects.Gabriele Ferretti - 2018 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 17 (4):643-679.
Are Visuomotor Representations Cognitively Penetrable? Biasing Action-Guiding Vision.Josefa Toribio - 2018 - Synthese (Suppl 17):1-19.