Abstract

It is commonly thought that Aristotle's aether, an unusual sort of matter filling the heavens, has been shown to be superfluous or even impossible by the advances of modern science. However, this opinion is questionable, and the Aristotelian doctrine is at root not trivial. This dissertation critically examines Aristotle's arguments for the existence of aether, first explaining how these arguments should be taken, and then supplementing them with the implications of his doctrine on light and recent developments in modern science. ;The first part of the dissertation is subdivided two sections, one on aether, the other on void. The first section is a careful study of the arguments for aether in De Caelo I.2, manifesting that each assumes at least one questionable premise. But the ultimate foundation of the doctrine of aether is not principally in De Caelo I.2; rather, it lies in the refutation of void in Physics IV.6--9. Accordingly, the second section examines and defends certain of the arguments against void, arguing that one who postulates void must maintain a number of physical impossibilities. This section concludes with a consideration of additional argument against void---implicit in Aristotle's metaphysics---proceeding from the nature of accidents. ;On this reading of the arguments against void the resulting conclusion is that the heavens must be filled with some kind of substance, but not that this substance must be of an unusual nature. To supplement this imperfection in the natural-philosophic argument, there follows the second part of the dissertation, showing a significant compatibility between Aristotle's general idea of aether and the findings of contemporary physics. First, I summarize Aristotle's account of light and the transparent medium in De Anima II.7 and De Sensu et Sensato 3, and their relation to aether. Then I look to twentieth-century treatments of light and energy, arguing that they suggests three candidates for a modern day "aether": first, the curved space-time of general relativity; second, the vacuum of quantum electrodynamics; and third, cosmic microwave background radiation. Each of these seems to imply not only the existence of a physical agency that fills every place regarded as empty in Newtonian physics, but also that this sort of "substance" is not the matter with which we are most familiar