Can logical consequence be deflated?

In Insolubles and Consequences : essays in honour of Stephen Read. College Publications. pp. 23-33 (2012)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

An interesting question is whether deflationism about truth (and falsity) extends to related properties and relations on truthbearers. Lionel Shapiro (2011) answers affirmatively by arguing that a certain deflationism about truth is as plausible as an analogous version of deflationism about logical consequence. I argue that the argument fails on two counts. First, it trivializes to any relation between truthbearers, including substantive ones; in other words, his argument can be used to establish that deflationism about truth is as plausible as deflationism about an arbitrary sentential relation. Second, the alleged analogy between the arguments for deflationism about truth and deflationism about consequence fails. Along the way I consider what implications the failure of the equiplausibility thesis has for deflationism about falsity.

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive

External links

  • This entry has no external links. Add one.
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Deflating logical consequence.Lionel Shapiro - 2011 - Philosophical Quarterly 61 (243):320-342.
Deflationism and the Value of Truth.James R. Beebe - 2003 - Journal of Philosophical Research 28:391-402.
Reinflating Logical Consequence.Owen Griffiths - 2012 - Journal of Philosophical Logic (1):1-9.
What is deflationism about truth?Matti Eklund - 2017 - Synthese 198 (2):631-645.
Deflationism About Logic.Christopher Blake-Turner - 2020 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 49 (3):551-571.
Deflating Deflationism.Bradley Philip Armour-Garb - 1999 - Dissertation, City University of New York
In defence of the villain: Edwards on deflationism and pluralism.Jeremy Wyatt - 2023 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 66 (8):1513-1537.
Deflationism and truthmaking.Matthew Simpson - 2019 - Synthese 198 (4):3157-3181.

Analytics

Added to PP
2015-09-28

Downloads
400 (#61,876)

6 months
96 (#59,682)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Michael De
Utrecht University

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references