Why the hard problem of consciousness will never be solved.

Abstract

The purpose of this paper is to argue that (1) that the hard problem of consciousness is concerned with subjective experience; (2) subjective experience arises from the measure of absolute quantities directly by our senses; (3) objective experience, on the other hand, arises from the measure of relative quantities which are invariant to perception; (4) only relative quantities can be shared with others; (5) consequently the hard problem is forever locked inside the head of each individual and can never be discussed, explained or shared with another. (6) Accordingly, no theory can, in principle, be formulated to explain it.

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Philip G Davies
Bournemouth University

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