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The Causal Theory of Action
In Timothy O'Connor & Constantine Sandis (eds.), A Companion to the Philosophy of Action. Oxford, UK: Wiley‐Blackwell. pp. 32–39 (2010)
Abstract
This chapter contains sections titled: Action Intentional vs Unintentional Action Autonomous Action Action for Reasons References Further reading.Author's Profile
causal theory of action ‘causal theory of action,’ that account for what it is for an agent to do something intentional vs unintentional action ‐ difference between intentionally turning on a light and unintentionally turning it on agent causation ‐ distinction between agent causation and event or state causation autonomous action ‐ heroin addict shooting up intentionally, while regarding the desire to do so as alien force action for reasons ‐ causal theory of reasons, that an agent does something for a reason causal theory, illuminating account of similarities and differences ‐ between two kinds of motivating reasons
My notes
Similar books and articles
I’m just sitting around doing nothing: on exercising intentional agency in omitting to act.Andrei A. Buckareff - 2018 - Synthese 195 (10):4617-4635.
Deviant Causal Chains.Rowland Stout - 2010 - In Timothy O'Connor & Constantine Sandis (eds.), A Companion to the Philosophy of Action. Oxford, UK: Wiley‐Blackwell. pp. 159–165.
Agent Causation and Acting for Reasons.Rebekah L. H. Rice - 2011 - American Philosophical Quarterly 48 (4):333-346.
Reasons and Action Explanation.Benjamin Wald & Sergio Tenenbaum - 2018 - In Daniel Star (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity. New York, NY, United States of America: Oxford University Press.
Con-reasons and the causal theory of action.Jonathan D. Payton - 2015 - Philosophical Explorations 18 (1):20-33.
The Causal and Deliberative Strength of Reasons for Action.David-Hillel Ruben - 2010 - In J. Aguilar & A. Buckareff (eds.), Causing Human Actions: New Perspectives on the Causal Theory of Action. Bradford.
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Citations of this work
Emotions as Affective Position-Takings and as Nonconceptual Meta-Representations: A Comparison.Rainer Reisenzein - 2022 - Emotion Review 14 (4):273-278.
Are basic actors brainbound agents? Narrowing down solutions to the problem of probabilistic content for predictive perceivers.George Britten-Neish - 2021 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 21 (2):435-459.
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