Ratio 30 (3):288-304 (2017)

Authors
Alex Davies
University of Tartu
Abstract
Several philosophers have recently claimed that if a proposition is cancellable from an uttered sentence then that proposition is not entailed by that uttered sentence. The claim should be a familiar one. It has become a standard device in the philosopher's tool-kit. I argue that this claim is false. There is a kind of entailment—which I call “modal entailment”—that is context-sensitive and, because of this, cancellable. So cancellability does not show that a proposition is not entailed by an uttered sentence. I close the paper by describing an implication this has for a disagreement between J. L. Austin and Grice concerning the relation between felicity and truth.
Keywords cancellability  entailment  context‐sensitivity
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Reprint years 2017
DOI 10.1111/rati.12140
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References found in this work BETA

Truth.J. L. Austin - 1950 - Aristotelian Society Supp 24 (1):111--29.
On What Is Strictly Speaking True.Charles Travis - 1985 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 15 (2):187 - 229.
Truth.J. L. Austin - 1999 - In Simon Blackburn & Keith Simmons (eds.), Truth. Oxford University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

Knowledge and Cancelability.Tammo Lossau - 2021 - Synthese 199 (1-2):397-405.

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