American Philosophical Quarterly 27 (3):179 - 197 (1990)
AbstractThe apparently paradoxical nature of self-deception has attracted a great deal of controversy in recent years. Focussing on those aspects of the phenomenon which involve the holding of "contradictory" beliefs, it is our intention to argue that this presents no "paradox" if a non-classical, "paraconsistent", doxastic logic is adopted. (On such logics, see, for example, N. C. A. da Costa, 'On the theory of inconsistent formal systems', Notre Dame J Formal Logic 11(1974), 497-510, and A. I. Arruda, 'A survey of paraconsistent logic', in A. I. Arruda, N. C. A da Costa and R Chuaqui, _Mathematical Logic in Latin America
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