The Journal of Ethics 23 (4):473-484 (2019)

Authors
Taylor W. Cyr
Samford University
Abstract
Some compatibilists are internalists. On their view, whether an agent is morally responsible for an action depends only on her psychological structure at that time. Other compatibilists are externalists. On their view, an agent’s history can make a difference as to whether or not she is morally responsible. In response to worries about manipulation, some internalists have claimed that compatibilism requires internalism. Recently, Alfred Mele has argued that this internalist response is untenable. The aim of this paper is to vindicate the claim that compatibilism requires internalism, showing where Mele’s argument goes wrong along the way.
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DOI 10.1007/s10892-019-09306-1
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References found in this work BETA

Free Will and Luck.Alfred R. Mele - 2006 - Oxford University Press.
Moral Luck.B. A. O. Williams & T. Nagel - 1976 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volumes 50:115-151.

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Citations of this work BETA

Epistemic Autonomy and Externalism.J. Adam Carter - 2020 - In Kirk Lougheed & Jonathan Matheson (eds.), Epistemic Autonomy. London: Routledge.
The Inescapability of Moral Luck.Taylor W. Cyr - 2021 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 10 (4):302-310.
Initial Design, Manipulation, and Moral Responsibility.John Martin Fischer - 2021 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 15 (2):255-270.

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