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Abstract
Temkin's Essentially Comparative View of moral ideals says that goodness is comparison set dependent: the goodness of an outcome is relativized to a set of outcomes. This view does not entail that betterness is intransitive; indeed, it provides the resources for maintaining transitivity. However, it does entail that the structure of goodness is more complex than is standardly supposed. It thereby demands a modification of the standard connection between goodness and decision. I set out this challenge, canvas some options, and show that Temkin vacillates between two of them.
Keywords Temkin  axiology  essentially comparative value  moral decision‐making  transitivity
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DOI 10.1002/tht3.240
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References found in this work BETA

Intransitivity and the Mere Addition Paradox.Larry S. Temkin - 1987 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 16 (2):138-187.
Vaulting Intuition: Temkin's Critique of Transitivity.Alex Voorhoeve - 2013 - Economics and Philosophy 29 (3):409-425.
Essentially Comparative Value Does Not Threaten Transitivity.Toby Handfield - 2016 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 5 (1):3-12.
Rethinking the Person-Affecting Principle.Jacob Ross - 2015 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 12 (4):428-461.

View all 12 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Population Axiology.Hilary Greaves - 2017 - Philosophy Compass 12 (11):e12442.
The Many, the Few, and the Nature of Value.Daniel Muñoz - forthcoming - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy.
Sources of Transitivity.Daniel Muñoz - forthcoming - Economics and Philosophy.
A Consequentialist Account of Narveson’s Dictum.John Cusbert & Robyn Kath - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (7):1693-1709.

View all 6 citations / Add more citations

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